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DEATH AND LIFE DECISIONS:
WHO IS IN CONTROL?
Stephen C. Kenney*
I. INTRODUCTION
What has been described as the greatest publishing event of the cen-
tury took place recently in the latest edition of the Oxford English Dic-
tionary.' Nestled among dictionary definitions of North American slang
is the "right to die," a term with origins in both law and medicine.
Although not specifically preserved as a constitutional right in federal or
state constitutions, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the "right to
die" as "the alleged right of a brain-damaged or otherwise incurably ill
person to the termination of life-sustaining treatment."2 Although this
dictionary definition is simply stated, the legal, medical and moral appli-
cations of this so-called "right" has caused a plethora of vexing
problems.
In April 1989, 86-year-old Carrie Coons lay in a New York hospi-
tal.3 Doctors diagnosed her condition as a "persistent vegetative state."4
* The author is a partner of Fisher & Hurst, San Francisco, California; B.S., Ohio State
University, 1966; J.D., Hastings College of Law, University of California, 1972; Member,
Moot Court Board, 1971-72; Author: Punitive Damages in Aviation Cases: Solving the Insur-
ance Coverage Dilemma, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 753 (1983); Deregulation of Airline Baggage
Tariffs: Will Insurers Get Caught Holding the Bag?, Underwriter's Report, June, 1982; Mem-
ber, Panel of Arbitrators, American Arbitration Association, San Francisco Superior Court
and United States District Court for Northern District of California; Member, Bar Association
of San Francisco; State Bar of California; American Bar Association [Litigation and Torts and
Insurance Sections, Aviation and Space Law Committee, Aviation Insurance Subcommittee];
Association of Defense Counsel; Defense Research Institute; Lawyer-Pilots Bar Association;
Aviation Insurance Association.
Mr. Kenney wishes to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable efforts of Genese Dopson
Smith, who assisted in many hours of research and preparation of this Article. Ms. Smith
graduated from Loyola Law School with a J.D. degree in 1982 and has a B.S. degree in Nurs-
ing. She was formerly the Head Nurse of an In-patient and Out-patient Oncology Unit at a
private hospital in Southern California between 1973 and 1977. Her legal practice has in-
cluded the defense and trial of cases involving doctors, hospitals, and medical product
manufacturers.
1. 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 923 (2d ed. 1989).
2. Id.
3. Right-To-Die Order Revoked As Patient In Coma Wakes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1989,
§ B, at 3, col. 5.
4. For the purposes of this Article, a "persistent vegetative stale" is defined as a focm of
unconsciousness arising from severe disruption of th coordinated functions of the brain
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Shortly after her sister obtained a court order authorizing removal of
Coons' life-sustaining feeding tube, Coons regained consciousness and
began to talk and eat small amounts of food.' She became alert enough
for her doctor to advise her of her right to die option, as well as the court
order obtained by her sister.' When asked by her doctor what she
wished to do, Ms. Coons replied, "[t]hese are difficult decisions," then
lapsed back into a coma.7
The causes and places of death have changed dramatically in recent
years. Most deaths today are caused by illnesses such as heart disease,
cancer or cerebrovascular disease, that frequently progress for years
before death occurs.' Almost ninety percent of the American population
succumbs to chronic degenerative conditions, as opposed to dying a sud-
den death.9 Additionally, over the years, death and dying have moved
out of the home and into the institutional setting. As a result, death
today frequently occurs in institutions equipped with life-sustaining tech-
nology that can keep the terminally ill"° alive for indefinite periods of
time."
Scientific advances have made it possible to live longer than ever
before, often without regard for the irrevocable loss of physical and
mental capacity that many patients suffer.' 2 In response, patients and
caused by a physical or chemically-induced injury. See Ingvar, Brun, Johansson & Samuelson,
Survival after Severe Cerebral Anr"ia with Destruction of the Cerebral Cortex: The Apallic
Syndrome, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 184, 202 (1978) ("Patients in a persistent vegetative
state may appear wakeful and their brain stems maintain subsistence activities and reflexes,
however, they suffer a complete loss of the higher functions of speech, volunt-ry muscular
activity, directed emotions, and signs of memory.").
5. Right-to-Die Order Revoked as Patient in Coma Wakes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1989,
§ B, at 3, col. 5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 16 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
9. Id. at 15-16.
10. This Article adopts the definition of "terminally ill" as used in Beatty, Artificial Nutri-
tion and the Terminally Ill: How Should Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 419, 419 n.2
(1986) ("[T]erminal illness means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness
from which there is no reasonable chance of recovery or cure, and which will, within reason-
able medical judgment, produce death in the foreseeable future, in the absence of life-sus-
taining treatment."). See also Cohen, Interdisciplinary Consultation on the Care of the
Critically Ill and Dying: The Role of One Hospital Ethics Committee, 10 CRITICAL CARE
MED. 776, 781 (1982). This Article includes among the terminally ill those persons in a persis-
tent vegetative state.
11. Beatty, supra note 10, at 419 n.3; Childress, Refial of Lifesaving Treatment by Adults,
23 J. FAM. L. 191, 194 (1984-85).
12. See In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 196, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 846, cert. denied,
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their families have increasingly asserted the "right to die" a natural
death, a death without undue dependence on medical technology or un-
necessarily protracted agony-in short, the "right to die" with dignity.
One court has noted that "'[o]nce someone realizes that the time and
manner of death are substantially under the control of medical science,
he or she wants to be protected against decisions that make death too
easy and quick as well ac from those that make it too agonizing and
prolonged.' "13
Absent legislation, the courts have been compelled to formulate new
standards and procedures for measuring the conduct of persons involved
in caring for the terminally ill or irreversibly brain-damaged.14 Courts
109 S. Ct. 399 (1988). The Drabick court noted that current literature recognizes that "'doc-
tors now choose from a vast array of interventions that, when combined with effective thera-
pies for underlying conditions, often greatly prolong survival. Unfortunately, the quality of
the additional life so skillfully sought can range from marginally tolerable to positively misera-
ble.'" Id., (quoting Ruark, Raffin & Stanford University Medical Center Committee on Eth-
ics, Special Article: Initiating and Withdrawing Life Support, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 25, 25
(1988)).
13. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985) (quoting PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 23).
14. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987) (where incompe-
tent patient has never expressed her medical desires, decisions concerning patient's medical
treatment are to be guided by standard which calls for evaluation of what is in patient's best
interest); Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (conservator of incompetent
person in vegetative state with no hope of recovery is authorized to decide, considering medical
advice and conservatee's best interests, that artificial life support should be withdrawn); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (although patient may
elect to refuse medical treatment hospital staff is still free to perform part of their duties, such
as trying to alleviate patient's pain and suffering); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d
186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984) (parties should act according to patient's instruction); Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (court-appointed or other
surrogate should make decisions first based on knowledge of patient's own desires and feelings;
in absence of legislation, there is no legal requirement for prior judicial approval); Dority v.
Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 193 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1983) (once infant has been deter-
mined to be brain dead, no criminal or civil liability may result from disconnecting life support
devices); Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072 (1979) (physician may declare
individual dead in accordance with accepted medical standards); Foody v. Manchester Memo-
rial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) ,family of semicomatose
patient could act as patient's substitute decision maker and decide to discontinue use of all
artificial devices intended to continue respiration and pulse); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del.
Ch. 1980) (guardian may carry out previously expressed intent of patient); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (court approval not necessary
for court-appointed guardian to authorize termination of life-support systems for comatose
and terminally ill individual who executed "living" or -mercy" will): Wons N. Public Health
Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (woman with t%%n minor children could refuse
blood transfusion needed to save her life based on religious beliefs, where she had made such a
refusal while competent); Corbett v. D'Alessandro. 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(patient in persistent vegetative state receiving nutritional sustenance solely through nasogas-
tric tube would have constitutionally protected right to have tube removed, subject to safe-
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have recognized that the use of medical devices or other artificial life-
guards); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (under doctrine of substituted
judgment, parents could assert right to privacy on behalf of ten-month old son in permanent
vegetative state and order termination of life support); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (competent, terminally ill 73-year-old man, whose affliction was not self-
induced and who had expressed desire to live on his own power, had right to discontinue use of
life-sustaining respirator); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (parents could
exercise right to refuse treatment on behalf of their terminally ill infant daughter who existed
in permanent vegetative state and who had no hope of developing cognitive function); Morgan
v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (although physician has duty to consult with
incompetent patient's surrogate decisionmaker before treatment, physician has no such duty to
incompetent's family, and patient's family may not recover for any breach of physician's duty);
In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982) (child in comatose state with no medically reasonable
chance of recovery has right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, and child's parents may assert
this right on behalf of child in judicial proceeding); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987)
(patient in persistent vegetative state has right to have life-sustaining procedures discontinued
when he has declared this desire prior to injury and before losing competency); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986) (hospital may act in accord-
ance with patient's substituted judgment); In re Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982)
(imposes doctrine of substituted judgment which ensures that personal decisions concerning
individual remain with individual); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (pri-
vate medical decisions by hospital staff must be made responsibly, subject to judicial scrutiny if
good faith or due care is brought into question in subsequent litigation); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (incompetent
may exercise right to privacy by substituted judgment of one acting on his or her behalf); In re
Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984) (in determining guardian's authority to
decide treatment for ward, court may consider facts that proposed treatment was intrusive and
burdensome, that patient had repeatedly and clearly indicated opposition to procedures neces-
sary to introduce tube feeding, that benefits of procedure were diminished by evidence of pa-
tient's medical history), review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); In re
Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) (judicial approval of guardian's
decision not to prolong life is necesary only where life-saving or life-prolonging treatment al-
ternatives exist); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1986) (conservator must act in best
interests of conservatee); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (role of guardian ad
litem is not to be "life advocate" because case law does not require continuation of life support
systems under all circumstances); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (if guardian
and family of patient conclude that patient would not have wanted life support, and attending
physician agrees that life support should be discontinued, and both attendi.ig physician and
hospital prognosis committee verify patient's medical condition, guardian may refuse treat-
ment on patient's behalf); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (competent patients
living at home may choose to discontinue life support if first determined by two non-attending
physicians that patient is competent, properly informed of prognosis, alternative treatments
and risks, and patient made choice voluntarily); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985) (substitute decision maker must balance patient's right to live and to die by determining
what decision patient would have made if competent; standard of decision is subjective); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (if guardian and patient's family conclude that patient
would not have wanted life support, and attending physician agrees that life support should be
discontinued, and both attending physician and hospital prognosis committee verify patient's
medical conditon, then guardian may refuse treatment on patient's behalf), cert. denied sub
nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517
A.2d 886 (1986) (patient's decision to refuse life support must be honored by hospital and
patient may not be removed from hospital without patient's consent); In re Clark, 210 N.J.
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sustaining measures make it possible to hold people on the "threshold"
Super. 548, 510 A.2d 136 (1986) (if family, attending and independent physicians, and hospital
committee cannot agree on life-support operation for incompetent, court determines what in-
competent patient would have decided if patient had been able to make own decision); In re
Visbeck, 210 N.J. Super. 527, 510 A.2d 125 (1986) (substitute decision maker must consider
views expressed by patient during time of competency); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (life support may be withdrawn only when there is clear and
convincing: (1) medical proof of irreversible brain damage without hope of restoration or
improvement, and (2) evidence of patient's wishes, together with family's agreement), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Harvey "U," 116 A.D.2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1986)
(substitute decision maker must establish clear and convincing evidence that patient is incom-
petent to give or refuse consent, is incapable of making informed rational decision on basis of
risks and benefits of surgery and cannot comprehend seriousness of condition); In re Beth
Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1987) (conservator must consider
which treatment would be in best interests of patient by assessing risk, benefits and alternatives
of treatment); Workmen's Circle Home & Infirmary for Aged v. Fink, 135 Misc. 2d 270, 514
N.Y.S.2d 893 (1987) (guardian must show clear and convincing evidence of comatose patient's
wish that life not be extended artificially); In re O'Brien, 135 Misc. 2d 1076, 517 N.Y.S.2d 346
(1986) (patient's expressions of annoyance and frustration are insufficient to demonstrate ca-
pacity to make a rational and competent decision to decline life-saving procedures); Vogel v.
Forman, 134 Misc. 2d 395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1986) (removal of nasal-gastric tube for feeding
prohibited where comatose patient in vegetative state is neither terminally ill nor brain dead);
In re Delio, 134 Misc. 2d 206, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1986) (life support may be withdrawn where
there is clear and convincing proof of patient's wishes not to exist in chronic vegetative state
when there is no hope of recovery); In re Saunders, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1985)
(living will implemented by court for terminally ill patient); Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp. v.
Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985) (pregnant patient cannot refuse blood
transfusions to herself or baby despite religous convictions after doctor undertakes life-threat-
ening surgery at patient's direction); A.B. v. C., 124 Misc. 2d 672, 477 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1984)
(court may not declare patient competent to decline life-support treatment before imposition of
such treatment); Lydia E. Hall Hosp. v. Cinque, 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1982)
(no compelling state interests exist to bar terminally-ill comatose patient's application to forgo
life support where patient made an informed, rational and knowing decision before patient
became comatose and patient had no dependants and had not attempted suicide); In re Milton,
29 Ohio St. 3d 20, 505 N.E.2d 255 (state cannot compel a legally competent adult to submit to
medical treatment in violation of her religous belief even though the treatment may be life-
extending), cert. denied sub nom. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health v. Milton, 484 U.S. 820 (1987);
Leach v Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980) (guardian for
terminally ill patient in permanent vegetative state, allowed to request removal of respirator,
after demonstrating that patient, if competent, would elect not to be placed on life support); In
re Estate of Dorone, 349 Pa. Super. 59, 502 A.2d 1271 (1985) (court questions use of substi-
tuted judgment doctrine); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987) (prior court
authorization to withhold life-sustaining treatment not required where legal guardian deter-
mines that incompetent patient would choose to refuse life-sustaining treatment or that with-
holding of life-sustaining treatment would be in patient's best interest, and no member of
patient's family or health care facility responsible for care of patient objects); In re Ingram, 102
Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984) (guardian under duty to exercise incompetent patient's
right of self determination by doing what patient would do if competent); In re Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (guardian may use his or her best judgment and exercise
incompetent's personal right to refuse life-sustaining treatment without court interference as
long as there is total agreement among treating physicians and prognosis committee); Dinino
v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 327, 684 P.2d 1297 (1984) (woman may not withdraw life-sustaining
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of death for indeterminate periods of time. 5 This "threshold" has been
described as "the penumbra where death begins but life in some form,
continies . . . [where] medical miracles . . . compel us to distinguish
between 'death' as we have known it, and death in which the body lives
in some fashion but the brain (or a significant part of it) does not."' 6
This Article sets out the legal basis for an individual's right to die,
along with the countervailing state interests. In addition, the Article
provides an overview of the legal doctrine developed following the semi-
nal case of In re Quinlan.'7 Further, the Article identifies who may make
the decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompe-
tent patient. Finally, the Article proposes measures to ensure that a per-
son's wishes regarding medical treatment are followed after the person
becomes incompetent from disease, trauma, or chemical changes.
II. THE RIGHT To REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
Courts have recognized that competent adult patients can give a
binding refusal to permit the use of life-sustaining medical care and treat-
ment.18 Most judicial decisions also recognize that there are circum-
stances where the burden of maintaining a person's corporeal existence
outweighs the benefit of prolonged life and "degrades the very humanity
such maintenance was meant to serve." 19 The California Court of Ap-
peal's decision in Bartling v. Superior Court20 is a prime example of judi-
cial recognition of this dilemma. William Bartling was seventy years old
procedures when she is neither terminally ill nor pregnant); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660
P.2d 738 (1983) (where physicians agree on prognosis of incompetent, and close family mem-
ber use., best judgment as guardian to exercise rights of incompetent's decision to terminate
life-sustaining treatment does not require judicial intervention), modified on other grounds, In
re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
15. See Bludworth, 452 So.2d at 923; Brophy, 398 Mass. at 420, 497 N.E.2d at 627.
16. Severns v. Wilmington Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1980); accord Barber,
147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
17. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
18. See Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985)
(court allowed competent adult patient in government facility to direct removal of life-sus-
taining treatment); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,
306 (1986) (28-year-old competent quadriplegic woman allowed to refuse nutrition and hydra-
tion from nasogastric tube); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 197 n.8, 209
Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 n.8 (1984) (70-year-old competent male had right to direct removal of
ventilator which sustained his respiration); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 359, 529 A.2d 404, 416
(1987) (court granted competent 37-year-old terminally ill woman's request to discontinue life-
sustaining medical treatment provided to her in her home).
19. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d
626, 635 (1986).
20. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
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and fully competent when he asked a California superior court for an
order compelling his physicians and the hospital to disconnect the venti-
lator which sustained his respiration.21 At the time, Bartling was suffer-
ing from emphysema, chronic respiratory failure, arteriosclerosis, an
abdominal aneurysm and a malignant tumor of the lung.22 The trial
court denied Bartling's request, a decision which he appealed.23 Unfor-
tunately, Bartling died on the afternoon prior to the hearing of his appeal
petition.24 He died with the ventilator still attached.2" His wishes had
been totally disregarded by his medical providers who feared civil and
criminal liability.26 At the urging of the parties, the appellate court ad-
dressed the merits of Bartling's petition, so that it could formulate guide-
lines to prevent a reoccurrence of the tragedy that befell Bartling. In
holding that Bartling had a right to have his wishes respected, the court
of appeal relied on the rationale of another right-to-die decision:27
It is all very convenient to insist on continuing [the patient's]
life so that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting
civil liability and no possible trespass on medical ethics. How-
ever, it is quite another matter to do so at the patient's sole
expense and against his competent will, thus inflicting never
ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but ar-
tificially suspended, moment of death. Such a course of con-
duct invades the patient's constitutional right of privacy,
removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to self-
determination.28
Courts confronted with the "right-to-die" dilemma have found both
a constitutional and a common-law basis for the right to choose or refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment;29 however, at least one commentator
has observed a trend toward placing more emphasis on common-law
grounds:
There appears to be a judicial trend to rely more on common
law prerogative and less on constitutional bases in discussions
of a 'right' to resist life-preserving treatment .... The reason
21. Id. at 189, 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221, 223.




26. Id. at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
27. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d' 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
28. Barling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195-96, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (quoting Satz v. Perlmut-
ter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
29. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
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for this recent trend is probably that the Supreme Court has
shown some signs of narrowing its concept of fundamental pri-
vacy, confining it primarily to personal choices surrounding re-
production, marriage, and family life. By establishing common
law informed consent as an alternative rationale for honoring a
patient's prerogative to resist life-preserving treatment, the
courts assure the upholding of the patient's prerogative regard-
less of the vicissitudes of constitutional interpretation. The pre-
rogative is secure as long as Legislatures are willing to accept
the judicially evolved doctrine.30
A. Constitutional Right to Privacy
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy
emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights and from the
language of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments.
3a
The freedom to care for one's health and person falls within the purview
of the right to privacy. 32 Most courts have interpreted the federal consti-
tutional privacy right as broad enough to encompass a person's decision
to refuse medical treatment under certain circumstances.3 3 More re-
30. N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 9-10 (1987).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973).
32. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973).
33. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301,
305 (1986) (insistence on continuing life against patient's will and at patient's sole expense
violates patient's constitutional right of privacy); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40
Conn. Supp. 127, 134-35, 482 A.2d 713, 719 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (state's interest out-
weighed by patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment where patient has no hope for
recovery); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980) (guardian may direct that
patient in vegetative state not be kept on life-support system where patient had previously
expressed such wish); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment based upon constitutional right to privacy as long as patient is
competent adult); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 438-39, 497
N.E.2d 626, 638 (1986) (patient's right to refuse treatment overcomes state interest in preserv-
ing life--"[D]eclining life-sustaining medical treatment may not properly be viewed as an at-
tempt to commit suicide. Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its
natural course; if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the
underlying disease, and not the result of a self-inflicted injury."); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,
634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980) (person may assert constitutional right of privacy "to prevent
unwanted infringements of bodily integrity"); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977) ("[C]onstitutional right to privacy
... is an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as funda-
mental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to
refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of choice."); In
re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984) (guardian may assert incompetent patient's con-
stitutional right to privacy by ordering life-support system to be disconnected); In re Jobes, 108
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cently, some states have recognized a right to privacy in their state con-
stitutions and have used state privacy statutes as a basis for finding a
right to die.34
The idea of a "right to die" under the United States Constitution
was first recognized in In re Quinlan.35 In that case, Karen Quinlan lay
in a persistent vegetative state,36 attached to a respirator.37  The New
Jersey Supreme Court found that the right to privacy was broad enough
to encompass the right to decline treatment. 38 The court also held that
Quinlan's right to privacy survived her incapacity. 39 To enable the exer-
N.J. 394, 399, 529 A.2d 434, 436-37 (1987) (guardian may assert incompetent patient's right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment where patient had clearly expressed such intentions prior to
accident that caused vegetative state); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 372-73, 529 A.2d 419, 422-23
(1987) (right to refuse life-sustaining treatment not lost because of incompetency; where evi-
dence shows patient would have refused treatment, guardian may assert such refusal on pa-
tient's behalf); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987) (patient's right to
refuse medical treatment is grounded in common law but also protected by federal and state
constitutional rights of privacy); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 ("[T]he
unwritten constitutional right of privacy.., is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances .... ."), cert. denied sub nom. Garger
v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 934-
35, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) ("Courts recognize that incompetent pa-
tients do not lose their constitutional right to privacy merely because of their incompetency
and that under certain circumstances a right to refuse life-prolonging or life-sustaining proce-
dures may be exercised in their behalf as an aspect of such right to privacy."); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1980) (constitutional right to
privacy guarantees a terminally ill person right to refuse medical treatment and is paramount
to any state interest unless that interest is compelling or outweighs the constitutional right); In
re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 552, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1987) (right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment stems from both constitutional right of privacy and common-law right to be free
from bodily invasion); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983) ("[A]n
adult who is incurably and terminally ill has a constitutional right of privacy that encompasses
the right to refuse treatment that serves only to prolong the dying process, given the absence of
countervailing state interests."), modified on other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810,
689 P.2d 1372 (1984). See also Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. Rv. 228 (1973);
Comment, Roe v. Wade and In re Quinlan: Individual Decision and the Scope of Privacy's
Constitutional Guarantee, 12 U.S.F. L. Rav. 111 (1977).
34. For instance, the California Constitution provides that: "All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, hap-
piness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d
at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301. See also Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 215, 741 P.2d
674, 682 (1987); In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40,
355 A.2d at 663; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 120, 660 P.2d at 742.
35. 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
36. See supra note 4 for a discussion of the term "persistent vegetative state."
37. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
38. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
39. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
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cise of this right, the court allowed Quinlan's guardian and family to use
their best judgment to determine whether Quinlan would have exercised
her right to privacy and refused further life-sustaining treatment.40
B. Common-Law Right
The right to refuse medical treatment also has common-law ori-
gins.4 1 Most states recognize that adults have the right to exercise con-
trol over their own bodies when determining whether or not to submit to
medical treatment.42 Accordingly, courts generally protect a person's
right to decide to accept or reject medical treatment, regardless of
whether the decision is wise or unwise.43
At the heart of the common-law right to be free from non-consen-
40. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. A privacy right founded on the United States Constitution
and applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment only extends to situations involv-
ing state action. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883); Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at
215 n.9, 741 P.2d at 682 n.9; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 120, 660 P.2d at
742; Long v. Chiropractic Soc'y, 93 Wash. 2d 757, 760-62, 613 P.2d 124, 127 (1980) (en banc).
Applying this rationale, courts have recognized a sufficient nexus between the state and the
challenged action so as to imply state presence in the form of a state's capability to impose
criminal sanctions, a state's licensing of physicians, state's judicial involvement in guardianship
appointments, and a state's parens patriae responsibility to supervise the affairs of incompe-
tents. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 215 n.9, 741 P.2d at 682 n.9 (state licensing of physicians);
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (state-appointed guardian);
Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d at 934, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 513 (state parens patriae
power); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 121, 660 P.2d at 742 (state imposition of criminal sanctions),
41. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). In Union Paciic, the Court
recognized that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." Id. at 251.
42. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137-38, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-01 (1986);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (1984); Foy
v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9-10, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 90 (1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398
Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416-17 (Mo.
1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347, 529 A.2d 404, 410
(1987); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70. 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 13,
516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 685-86 (1987); In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 934, 519
N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1987).
43. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 215-16, 741 P.2d 674, 682-83 (1987);
Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301: Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193-94,
209 Cal. Rptr. at 224; Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 489 (1983); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 430, 497 N.E.2d at 633; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 347,
486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985); Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
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sual bodily invasion is the doctrine of informed consent." Courts have
recognized three basic prerequisites for informed consent. First, the pa-
tient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments.45 Second,
the decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion.g6 Third,
the patient must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits asso-
ciated with the proposed treatment or non-treatment, along with a full
understanding of the disease and prognosis.4 7
C. State Interests
Neither the constitutional nor common-law right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment is absolute. Courts dealing with this complex issue
have uniformly balanced the individual's right to refuse life support
against the countervailing state interest in the preservation of life, pre-
vention of suicide and homicide, protection of interests of innocent third
parties, and the maintenance of the medical profession's ethical integ-
rity.a" Each of these state interests has received separate judicial
consideration.
The judiciary has recognized that the state's interest in preserving
life is the most significant of the four state interests.49 The state's interest
in preserving life embraces two separate but related concerns: (1) pre-
serving the life of the particular patient; and (2) preserving the sanctity of
44. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216, 741 P.2d at 683.
45. Id. See also Conroy, 98 N.J. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222.
46. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216, 741 P.2d at 683. See also Conroy, 98 N.J. at 347, 486
A.2d at 1222.
47. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216, 741 P.2d at 683; Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417; Conroy, 98
N.J. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 121-22, 660 P.2d 738, 743
(1983), modified on other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984);
Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig & van Eys, The
Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly 111 Patients, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 955, 957
(1984).
48. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304
(1986); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Sup. 127, 133, 482 A.2d 713, 718
(1984); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 432, 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (1986); In
re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 640-41, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123 (1980); Commissioner of Corrections v.
Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 261-62, 399 N.E.2d 452, 455-56 (1979); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-41, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); In re Hier, 18
Mass. App. Ct. 200, 210, 464 N.E.2d 959, 965, review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261
(1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 122-23, 660 P.2d 738, 743-44 (1983), modified on other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
49. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 588 (D.R.I. 1988); Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433, 497
N.E.2d at 635; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420
N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denhed, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
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all life." The state's interest in preserving life is very high in cases where
life can be saved and the affliction is curable."1 The interest wanes when
the underlying affliction is incurable and would soon bring about death
despite further medical treatment.
5 2
States also have an interest in the prevention of suicide.5 3 However,
the courts have held that an individual's determination to cease medical
treatment pursuant to his or her right of privacy does not constitute sui-
cide. 4 Courts have found a distinction between an individual who inten-
tionally ends an otherwise healthy life and an individual who simply
wants to die naturally. In other words, the refusal of medical treatment
so that nature can take its course does not necessarily indicate that the
patient has a specific intent to die.:
5 6
The state's interest in prevention of homicide is also implicated by
"right to die" cases. The only reported case involving criminal homicide
proceedings against medical practitioners for acceding to the wishes of an
incompetent patient's family by withdrawing life-support systems is Bar-
ber v. Superior Court.7 In that case, the patient became comatose fol-
lowing surgery when he sustained a cardiac arrest in the recovery
room. 8 The patient was not brain dead; rather, he was diagnosed as
being in a persistent vegetative state.59 Based upon the physicians' prog-
nosis that the patient had an extremely poor chance of recovering, the
family directed the physicians to remove all life-support equipment, in-
50. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222. Cf Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Han-
dling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 248-49 (1977) (general de-
scription of state's interests).
51. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
52. Id.
53. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 218, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987). See also
Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 137, 482 A.2d at 720; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40-41, 355 A.2d 647,
663-64, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
54. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 218, 741 P.2d at 685; Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 137, 482 A.2d
at 720; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 51-52,
355 A.2d at 669-70; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743.
55. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 350-51,
486 A.2d at 1224; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743.
56. Even if that intent were present, the resulting death would arguably be from natural
causes. Most importantly, the deceased patient who simply wanted to be allowed to die natu-
rally took no affirmative action intended to cause death. See Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 218, 741
P.2d at 685; Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 137, 482 A.2d at 720; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.l 1,
370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351, 486 A.2d at 1224; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123,
660 P.2d at 743.
57. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
58. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
59. Id. See supra note 4 for a definition of "persistent vegetative state."
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cluding a respirator and intravenous feeding tubes.' Between the re-
moval of the life-sustaining apparatus and the time of the patient's death,
the patient "received nursing care which preserved his dignity and pro-
vided a clean and hygienic environment."'61
Following the patient's death, the physicians were charged with
murder and conspiracy to commit murder.62 The complaint was initially
dismissed by a magistrate, but reinstated by the superior court.63 The
court of appeal in Barber reversed, thereby ending the criminal prosecu-
tion."4 The court of appeal held that there was no duty to continue treat-
ment once the treatment proved to be ineffective.65 Accordingly, the
court found there was no unlawful failure to perform a legal duty. 6 Vir-
tually all jurisdictions have held that health care providers will not be
criminally liable for homicide when life-sustaining equipment is removed
at the direction of a competent patient, as long as procedures and safe-
guards outlined by the court have been followed.6 7 In addition, courts
have indicated that the removal of life-sustaining apparatus from incom-
petent patients will not involve the risk of criminal liability if such re-
moval is based on substituted decision-making as approved by the
court.6 8
The state has an interest in safeguarding the integrity of the medical
profession.69 Even so, courts have noted that prevailing medical ethics
recognize that the dying are frequently in need of comfort rather than
60. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94.
65. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
66. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. The court held that:
A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved to be ineffective.
Although there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in the immediate
aftermath of a cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once it
has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel.
Id.
67. Cf. A. MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 56-57 (1989) ("Despite the virtual absence of
attempts to impose criminal liability for the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment and the re-
fusal of some district attorneys even to participate in civil litigation at the invitation of parties
or courts, many right-to-die cases have been litigated in whole or in part as a result of the fear
of criminal or civil liability.").
68. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. Ch. 1980); Spring,
380 Mass. at 637, 405 N.E.2d at 121 (citing Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A
Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 304, 310-11 (1977)).
69. See generally Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 921; Myers, 379 Mass. at 266, 399 N.E.2d at
458; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984); Saunders v. State of New York, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 50, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (1985).
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treatment.7" In addition, the medical profession no longer requires the
administration of medical treatment under all circumstances. 71 As the
law currently stands, if the patient rejects the doctor's advice, the onus of
that decision rests on the patient, not the doctor.72
Finally, the state's interest in preserving life increases when innocent
third parties are affected by an individual's decision to die.73 In fact, the
state's interest may well be superior to an adult's right of self-determina-
tion when the exercise of that right deprives dependents of a source of
support and care.74 For example, the courts have historically compelled
certain individuals to have medical treatment when the interests of small
children are at stake.75
70. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743-44, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660
P.2d at 743-44.
71. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 217, 741 P.2d at 684. Quoting the American Medical Associ-
ation, the court noted that the Association does not require medical treatment in all
circumstances:
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suffering. Where
the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice of the patient, or his
family or legal representative if the patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf,
should prevail. In the absence of the patient's choice or an authorized proxy, the
physician must act in the best interest of the patient.
For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do what is medi-
cally necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit treatment to permit a termi-
nally ill patient whose death is imminent to die. However, he should not
intentionally cause death. In deciding whether the administration of potentially life-
prolonging medical treatment is in the best interest of the patient who is incompetent
to act in his own behalf, the physician should determine what the possibility is for
extending life under humane and comfortable conditions and what are the prior ex-
pressed wishes of the patient and attitudes of the family or those who have responsi-
bility for the custody of the patient.
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible
and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis and with
the concurrence of those who have responsibility for the care of the patient, it is not
unethical to discontinue all means of life prolonging medical treatment.
Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or tech-
nologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a terminally ill or
irreversibly comatose patient; the physician should determine whether the benefits of
treatment outweigh its burdens. At all times, the dignity of the patient should be
maintained.
Id. (quoting Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Withholding or
Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment (March 15, 1986) (statement on file at
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (emphasis added)).
72. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 352, 486 A.2d at 1225.
73. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d
537, 538, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
74. See-Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 218, 741 P.2d at 685; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at
1225; Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377-78 n.6, 420 N.E.2d at 71 n.6, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273 n.6; Leach v.
Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9-10, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1980); cf. Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination law enforced).
75. In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (mother of seven-month-old infant compelled to submit to blood transfusion, over
DEATH AND LIFE DECISIONS
III. INCOMPETENCY AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL
TREATMENT
Most courts have held that a competent person's right to have life-
sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn extends to persons who be-
come incompetent.76 Some courts have allowed otherwise incompetent
adult patients to exercise the right to refuse medical treatment in situa-
tions where the person was deemed competent enough to make health
care decisions.7" In other cases the incompetent patient's right to refuse
further life-prolonging care has been successfully raised by third persons
where the patient is terminally ill and the care offers no real hope of
restoring the patient to relative health.7" Most cases in this area have
mother's religious objections), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964); Raleigh, 42 N.J. at 423, 201
A.2d at 538 (woman in 32nd week of pregnancy ordered to submit to life-saving blood transfu-
sions, despite her religious convictions, because life of mother and fetus were inseparable). See
also Myers, 379 Mass. at 266, 399 N.E.2d at 458 (to prevent serious risk to prison security,
prisoner with kidney disease compelled to undergo dialysis treatment over his protest that
treatment rendered him unable to defend himself).
76. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 25, 355 A.2d 647, 655, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
77. See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 288, 383 A.2d 785, 788 (1978)
(hospital sought appointment of guardian who could consent to amputation of 72-year-old
patient's gangrenous feet. Patient objected to procedure and was aware of consequences of the
refusal, although there was evidence patient was suffering from mental disorder; hence, court
refused to order amputation); cf State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197,
210 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (state sought to compel life-saving amputation of 72-year-old patient's
feet, over patient's objection; despite patient's strong objection to procedure, court held patient
was incompetent to refuse treatment because she did not say she preferred death to the ampu-
tation of her feet in her refusal), cert. denied, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn.), appeal dismissed as moot
sub nom. Northern v. Department of Human Resources, 436 U.S. 923 (1978).
78. Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 133, 482 A.2d 713, 718
(1984) (to deny exercise of individual's right to privacy to be free from unwarranted infringe-
ments of bodily integrity, including medical treatment, because individual is unconscious,
would be denial of that right; therefore, guardian had standing to assert patient's privacy
right); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (right to have nasogastric
tube removed held by court to be constitutionally protected right, assertable by patient's hus-
band, in case involving 75-year-old woman in persistent vegetative state who had no reasonable
prospect of regaining cognitive brain function), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (1986); John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 925-26 (Fla. 1984) (right to
refuse treatment by irreversibly comatose patient in persistent vegetative state with no reason-
able medical expectation of returning to cognitive life may be exercised either by close family
members or by court-appointed guardian; if close family members are available and wish to
exercise incompetent patient's right to refuse treatment, there is no requirement for court to
additionally appoint guardian); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3, 426
N.E.2d 809, 811 (1980) (husband appointed guardian and allowed to exercise privacy rights of
70-year-old spouse, who was diagnosed as in persistent vegetative state with no hope of recov-
ery and where patient, when competent, had expressed desire not to be placed on life-support
system).
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dealt with patients who were irreversibly comatose or suffering from a
persistent vegetative state.79
The legal trend is to give first priority to treatment preferences that
the incompetent patient expressed when competent.80 Most courts have
also held that, at least to some extent, incompetent patients have the
same rights with regard to medical treatment as competent patients. 81
The courts have extended these rights to incompetent patients by apply-
ing one of three tests: (1) the subjective test; (2) the limited-objective
test; or (3) the pure-objective test.
A. The Subjective Test
The "subjective test" is predicated on a guardian's substituted judg-
ment82 and is applied when there is evidence that the patient would have
refused the medical treatment under the circumstances if the patient
79. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,486 (1983);
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Del. Ch. 1980); Bludworth, 452
So. 2d at 922; In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 466-67, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135 (1978); In
re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Minn. 1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 25, 355 A.2d 647,
655, cert. denied sub. nor. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Leach v. Akron Gen.
Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 2, 426 N.E.2d 809, 810 (1980); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d
545, 547-50, 747 P.2d 445, 446-48 (1987) (en banc); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 812-13,
689 P.2d 1372, 1374-75 (1984). See supra note 4 for a definition of "persistent vegetative
state."
80. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
360-62, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985); Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Con-
ceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 373, 374 (1986).
81. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977) (right to refuse medical treatment based on individual circumstances
must be extended to incompetent patient to protect human dignity); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at
124, 660 P.2d at 744 (to protect their privacy and dignity, right of incompetent persons to
refuse medical treatment should be equal to rights of competent persons).
82. Levant, Natural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey, in HOSPITAL LIABILiTY 476
n.16 (M. Bertolet 5th ed. 1987). Levant remarks:
The doctrine of substituted judgment is sometimes used by courts in carrying out
theirparenspatriae responsibility to protect those under disability in the area of med-
ical decision making. It is the method by which a guardian, in making a decision for
his ward, tries to determine what decision the ward would have made under the
circumstances, if able.
d (citation omitted). See also In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 369, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 (court authorized removal of mechanical ventilator from terminally ill pa-
tient, finding that termination of treatment was consistent with wishes patient had expressed
when competent; intermediary was religious superior who had known patient for lengthy pe-
riod of time when patient had clearly and convincifigly demonstrated patient's choice), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3-4, 426
N.E.2d 809, 811 (1980) (after numerous witnesses testified to patient's medical condition and
her previously expressed desire not to be placed on life-sustaining machines, court adopted
substituted judgment test, holding that husband could exercise patient's privacy rights by di-
recting discontinuance of life-sustaining measures).
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were competent.83
Support for the use of the substituted judgment test first appeared in
the landmark case In re Quinlan. 4 Karen Ann Quinlan ceased breathing
for two separate fifteen-minute periods on the night of April 15, 1975.85
As a result, she suffered severe brain damage and was characterized by
medical experts as being in a persistent vegetative state.86 Quinlan was
not brain dead within any definitional terms.87 In fact, she was "alive"
under the controlling legal and medical standards at the time. 8 Quin-
lan's father petitioned the court to order removal of her respirator.8 9
Agreeing with the medical experts, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
concluded that Karen would never be restored to cognitive or sapient
life.9" The Quinlan court held that Karen's father, as her guardian,
could exercise his daughter's constitutional right to privacy and author-
ize the removal of the respirator, which was thought to sustain her
breathing. 91 In so doing, the court preserved Karen's personal right of
privacy against bodily intrusions by allowing a third person to assert that
right on her behalf.92
In espousing the principle of substituted judgment, the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he only practical way to prevent destruc-
tion of the right [to privacy in choosing or refusing life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment] is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render
their best judgment ...as to whether she would exercise it in these
circumstances.
93
83. Levant, supra note 82, at 476.
84. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
85. Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 654.
86. Id. at 23-24, 355 A.2d at 654.
87. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.
88. Id. at 28, 355 A.2d at 656.
89. Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 652.
90. Id. at 25-29, 355 A.2d at 655-57.
91. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
92. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
93. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. This holding was subject to some qualifications:
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the responsible
attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever
emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that
the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be discontinued,
they shall consult with the hospital 'Ethics Committee' or like body of the institution
in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that consultative body agrees that there is no
reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition
to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be withdrawn ....
Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
The Quinlan court's quality-of-life considerations (cognitive and sapient) have subse-
quently been eschewed by some courts. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398
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Following Quinlan, the substituted judgment test was next consid-
ered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.94 In Saikewicz, a
mentally retarded adult resident of a state school suffered from acute
myeloblastic monocytic leukemia and was incapable of giving the in-
formed consent necessary for chemotherapy treatment.95 Saikewicz was
profoundly mentally retarded and had a mental age of two years, eight
months.96 The court recognized that although most persons with a simi-
lar diagnosis would choose to undergo chemotherapy, Saikewicz' inabil-
ity to cooperate with treatment and to understand the disruption in his
routine-in particular, the severe side effects of the chemotherapy-
made it likely that Saikewicz would, if he could, decide against undergo-
ing treatment. 97 In applying the substituted judgment test, the Saikewicz
court mentioned that
the decision in cases such as this should be that which would be
made by the incompetent person, if that person were compe-
tent, but taking into account the present and future incompe-
tency of the individual as one of the factors which would
necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the com-
petent person.98
Like Quinlan, the Saikewicz decision was premised on the right to pri-
vacy founded in the United States Constitution. 99
In 1981, the New York Court of Appeals held that the common-law
right to refuse medical treatment was sufficient to warrant the termina-
tion of life-sustaining treatment, in In re Storar.1° In that case, one
Eichner represented the interests of Brother Fox, who was a retired
member of the Society of Mary."°1 Brother Fox lived with, and per-
formed limited duties for religious members who operated the Chami-
Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 754-55, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (1977); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 420-22 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
94. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
95. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
96. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
97. Id. at 753-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
98. Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431; cf Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d it 72,
438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The Storar case involved two plaintiffs, one of whom was also pro-
foundly retarded. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. In that case the court
noted that "it [would be] unrealistic to attempt to determine whether [the patient] would want
to continue potentially life prolonging treatment if he were competent." Id. at 380, 420
N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
99. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739-40, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
100. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
101. Id. at 370-71, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
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nade High School."°2 While undergoing surgery to repair a hernia, he
suffered a cardiac arrest. As a result of the loss of oxygen to his brain,
Brother Fox suffered substantial brain damage. This in turn caused the
loss of Fox's ability to breathe independently and he was thereafter main-
tained in a persistent vegetative state by a respirator.° 3 Prior to his car-
diac arrest, Brother Fox had engaged in formal discussions regarding the
Quinlan case; such discussions had been prompted by Chaminade's mis-
sion to teach and promulgate Catholic moral principles." 4 Brother Fox
had clearly indicated that he wanted nothing extraordinary done to keep
him alive if it became necessary. 0 5 Noting the solemn and formal cir-
cumstances of Brother Fox's expressed desire to forego extraordinary
medical treatment, the court found his common-law right to refuse medi-
cal treatment controlling.1
0 6
Many other courts have dealt with situations where the incompetent
patient did not articulate his or her preferences regarding death and life-
sustaining procedures prior to becoming incompetent. Some courts con-
sidered the patient's character, tastes, religious beliefs, and prior behavior
patterns to determine what the patient would want. In In re Colyer,'07
the court allowed the patient's husband to rely on the patient's independ-
ent personality and dislike for physicians to determine that the patient
would not want to be maintained in a persistent vegetative state.'0 8 In In
re Torres,'09 a decision to withdraw medical treatment was based in part
on testimony that the patient, prior to becoming comatose, had refused a
pacemaker to compensate for a serious heart problem.10 In In re
Spring," the court permitted the introduction of evidence regarding a
senile seventy-eight-year-old man's physical condition to support the de-
termination of his wife and son that the patient would want to be re-
moved from kidney dialysis apparatus."'
Decisions allowing the removal of a life-sustaining medical appara-
tus from a patient who did not express a prior preference regarding ter-
minal care have been the subject of criticism by commentators, on the
102. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
105. Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
106. Id.
107. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified on other grounds, In re Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
108. Id. at 132, 660 P.2d at 748.
109. 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
110. Id. at 335.
111. 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
112. Id. at 632-33, 405 N.E.2d at 118.
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ground that the patient's approval was not obvious.' 13 Some courts have
similarly refused to engage in substituted decision making unless clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes when the patient was
competent is available. 1 4 For example, in In re Westchester County
Medical Center,"' the Court of Appeals of New York held that the sub-
stituted judgment approach "remains unacceptable because it is inconsis-
tent with our fundamental commitment to the notion that no person or
court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable
quality of life for another." '16 Accordingly, the New York court held
that the daughters of seventy-seven-year-old Mary O'Connor, who was
brain damaged and hospitalized from multiple strokes, could not refuse
artificial feeding by a nasogastric tube without clear and convincing evi-
dence that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to the termi-
nation of life supports under the same or similar circumstances. 17
B. The Limited Objective Test
The "limited objective test" is based on a "best interests" stan-
dard. 1 8 The best interests standard was initially articulated by a New
Jersey court in In re Conroy.' 19 In that case, Claire Conroy was an eld-
erly nursing home patient who had become increasingly confused, disori-
ented and physically dependent. 2 ' She became incapable of swallowing
sufficient amounts of food and water, and ultimately a nasogastric tube
113. See, e.g., N. CANTOR, supra note 30, at 66.
114. See, eg., In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 529, 531 N.E.2d
607, 612, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 891 (1988); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-79, 420 N.E.2d 64,
72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
115. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
116. Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 530-34, 531 N.E.2d at 613-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892-94. Cf. In re Beth Israel
Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (patient's right to
refuse medical treatment should not be rejected because incompetent patient did not suffi-
ciently manifest her wishes when she was competent).
118. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 746-47, 370
N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985); see also
Levant, supra note 82, at 477 n.25. Levant observes:
The "best interests" standard is a shorthand phrase that describes the criteria used by
the state, through its courts, in exercising its parens patriae power, when making
decisions for an incompetent person whose wishes cannot be clearly established.
Such decisions are based on a determination of what will serve the incompetent per-
son's interests. If a decision whether to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment must be made for an incompetent, courts will consider whether the pain and
suffering experienced by the patient outweigh the benefits that the patient will derive
from the treatment.
Id.
119. 98 N.J. 321, 365, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
120. Id. at 336, 486 A.2d at 1216.
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was inserted to provide her with nutrition and hydration.1 21 Conroy's
nephew, acting as her guardian, brought an action seeking permission to
remove the feeding tube.
122
At the trial, evidence demonstrated that Conroy was confined to bed
in a fetal position and that she suffered from arteriosclerotic heart dis-
ease, hypertension, and diabetes mellitus.'23 Her left leg was gangrenous
to the knee and she had necrotic decubitus ulcers on her left foot, leg,
and hip. 24 She had a urinary catheter in her bladder and had bowel
incontinence. She was unable to speak or interact meaningfully with her
environment. 125 Her intellectual capacity was limited, and the doctors
felt that her mental capacity would never improve. 26 However, she was
not brain dead, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state.' 27
The trial court found that Conroy's intellectual functioning had
been reduced to a primitive level and that her life was impossibly burden-
some.' 28 The court held that it was therefore permissible to remove the
feeding tube.' 29 The case was appealed but Ms. Conroy died before the
appellate court could resolve the matter.' 30 In spite of her death, the
appellate court decided to resolve the meritorious issues because they
were of significant public importance and capable of repetition.13 1
The Conroy court found that Conroy had a common-law right to
self-determination that survived her becoming incompetent. 32  The
court held that the right was exercisable by a substitute decision-maker
who was required to simultaneously respect the patient's right to live, as
well as the right to die of natural causes without medical intervention. 33
However, Conroy had never made her desires regarding life-sustaining
treatment known when she was competent.13 4 The Conroy court noted
that
121. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
122. Id. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216.
123. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 337-38, 486 A.2d at 1217.
127. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
128. Id. at 341, 486 A.2d at 1219.
129. Id. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218.
130. Id. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223. Cf In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663
(right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment was based on constitutional right to privacy),
cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
133. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 356, 486 A.2d at 1227. See supra notes 82-117 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the substituted judgment test.
134. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 363-64, 486 A.2d at 1231. One commentator has observed:
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in the absence of adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it is
naive to pretend that the right to self-determination serves as
the basis for substituted decision-making.... [Rather,] [a]n in-
competent, like a minor child, is a ward of the state, and the
state's parens patriae power supports the authority of its courts
to allow decisions to be made for an incompetent that serve the
incompetent's best interests, even if the person's wishes cannot
be clearly established. This authority permits the state to au-
thorize guardians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment from an incompetent patient if it is manifest that such
action would further the patient's best interests ....135
The Conroy court went on to formulate the limited objective test. 136
Under this test, a decision can be made to withhold life-sustaining treat-
ment "when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would
have refused the treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is
clear that the burdens of the patient's continued life with [life-sustaining]
The Conroy decision recognized both that actual patient preferences will be un-
discernible in many instances, and that "in the absence of adequate proof of the
patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that the right to self-determination serves as
the basis for substituted decision-making." The point is well taken. Self-determina-
tion normally requires an individualized assertion of tastes, preferences, and priori-
ties on the part of a competent being. Usually, this means an exercise of choice
contemporaneous with the medical circumstances facing the patient. Free choice
may also be meaningful when an individual's prior instructions are implemented af-
ter the individual has become incompetent. Where a patient has never articulated
personal preferences about death, the dying process, and tolerable burdens in the face
of death, it is somewhat presumptuous to purport to be effectuating patient choice.
In acknowledging these factors, Conroy averted a basic error, mentioned above,
which has plagued predecessor courts. This was the attempt to articulate and apply
a "substituted judgment" standard-deciding what the now incompetent patient
would want done under the current circumstances-in the absence of clear-cut or
meaningful indications of patient feelings about death and dying.... [For example,
... some courts have tried to use an incompetent patient's prior aversion to doctors
and hospitals as a basis for a substituted judgment that the patient would resist life-
preserving medical treatment. This appears to be a questionable premise, at least
where the prior aversion was not in the context of a potentially fatal medical condi-
tion.
While the Conroy court realized that substituted judgment was largely a pre-
tense in the absence of meaningful prior expressions by a patient, the court wished to
promote humane handling for languishing patients who had not clearly expressed
their own preferences. That is, the judges did not wish to condemn to an indefinite
lingering state a dying patient whose continued existence is torturous, or of no net
benefit to the patient, but who had lacked the foresight or opportunity to supply prior
instructions. The solution adopted by the Conroy court was a "best interests of the
patient" standard involving assessment of net benefit or burden to the patient from
the preservable existence.
The best interests standard was broken down into two strands--denominated
the "limited objective" and "pure objective" tests.
N. CANTOR, supra note 30, at 68-69.
135. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231.
136. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
DEATH AND LIFE DECISIONS
treatment outweigh the benefits of that life .... Under the limited
objective test, medical evidence must establish that the burdens of treat-
ment outweigh the benefits of continued life, so as to clearly demonstrate
that the treatment would merely prolong the patient's suffering without
providing any net benefit. 138 Trustworthy evidence that the incompetent
patient would have wanted the treatment terminated can be presented in
various forms, such as the patient's competently expressed reactions to
other people's medical conditions and treatment, or the patient's per-
sonal philosophies or religious beliefs. 139
C. The Pure Objective Test
The Conroy court articulated a third test, called the "pure objective
test," for circumstances where there is either no trustworthy evidence
that the incompetent patient would have wanted treatment-terminated,
or no evidence that the patient would have declined life-sustaining treat-
ment. 14° The pure objective test is also based on a best interests stan-
dard.141 According to the Conroy court, the pure objective test should be
applied when the net burdens of the patient's life with treatment clearly
and markedly outweigh the benefits the patient derives from life. 42 In
addition, the court held that the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain
of the patient's life with treatment must be such that it would be inhu-
mane to provide life-sustaining treatment.143 However, the court warned
that even in the context of severe pain, the pure objective test should not
be used to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent pa-
tient who has previously stated a wish to be kept alive even in the event
of pain or suffering."4
In Conroy, the appellate court ultimately held that the record did
not satisfy any of the standards articulated under either the subjective,
limited objective or pure objective tests. 145 While the evidence of Con-
roy's wishes was sufficient to meet the limited objective test's lower bur-
den of proof required to show the pre-incompetency desires of the
137. Id. The burdens of continued life with treatment outweigh the benefits of that life in
situations where the patient is suffering and will continue to suffer unavoidable pain, so as to
markedly outweigh any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction
that the patient derives from life. Id.
138. Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
139. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
140. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 366-67, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
141. See supra note 118.
142. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
145. Id. at 385-87, 486 A.2d at 1242-43.
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patient, the court found that there was insufficient information in the
record regarding the benefits and burdens of Conroy's continued life to
satisfy the balancing component of either the limited objective or pure
objective tests. 146
Subsequent to Conroy, the limited objective and pure objective tests
were reviewed by a New York court in In re Beth Israel Medical
Center,47 a case involving an incompetent patient named Sadie Wein-
stein. There was no evidence before the court of Weinstein's desires re-
garding life-sustaining treatment when she was competent. 4 The court
stated that, nevertheless, "[c]learly, some objective standards must be
employed" so that decisions can be made in the incompetent patient's
behalf. 4 1 The Beth Israel court concluded that the following factors
should be considered in order to determine whether the burdens to a
particular patient in prolonging life markedly outweigh the benefits of
continued life: age; life expectancy with, and without, the treatment or
procedure; degree of present and future pain or suffering; the extent of
the patient's physical and mental disability and the degree of helpless-
ness; statements (if any) made by the patient which directly or impliedly
manifest the patient's views on life-prolonging measures; the quality of
the patient's life with, or without, the procedure; the risks to life or ad-
verse side effects created by the contemplated procedure; the patient's
religious or ethical beliefs; the views of the patient's family and friends;
the views of the physicians; the type of care which will be required if life
is prolonged as contrasted with the availability of such care; and,
whether the state has any overridingparenspatriae interests in sustaining
life.'50 The Beth Israel court indicated that decisions involving these cri-
teria are best made by the family, in consultation with the patient's phy-
sician. 15' However, in the absence of family, or where there is a dispute,
the court will step in to resolve the issues.1
52
146. Id.
147. 136 Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1987).
148. Id. at 941, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
149. Id. at 938, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 516; but cf In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115
(1980) (private medical decisions by hospital staff must be made responsibly, subject to judicial
scrutiny if good faith or due care is brought into question in subsequent litigation); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1986) (if conservatee's best interests are no longer served by
maintenance of life supports, court may empower conservator to order removal of life-sus-
taining equipment).
150. Beth Israel, 136 Misc. 2d at 940, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
151. Id. at 937, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
152. Id. at 937-38, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
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D. Cruzan v. Harmon
Since the landmark decision in In re Quinlan,153 several states have
developed bodies of law dealing with the "right to die." As might be
expected, state courts confronted with "right to die" cases have not pro-
duced uniform decisions, and have left many important issues un-
resolved. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not resolved the
doctrinal issues posed by these conflicting decisions. However, with the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision to grant certiorari in the
Missouri case, Cruzan v. Harmon,154 that may soon change.
Following an automobile accident where she was found lying at the
side of the road, Nancy Cruzan was diagnosed as being in a persistent
vegetative state with no hope of recovery. 155 In a narrowly drafted deci-
sion, the Missouri Supreme Court held that substituted judgment could
not be utilized on Nancy Cruzan's behalf unless there was clear and con-
vincing evidence that, prior to her accident, Nancy held a firm commit-
ment to the termination of life support under the same or similar
circumstances. 156 The court concluded that the evidence presented did
not meet this quantum of proof.'57 On that basis, the court declined to
terminate artificial hydration and nutrition as requested by Cruzan's
guardians.158 The guardians appealed.
59
The Cruzan case affords the United States Supreme Court the op-
portunity to address a number of unsettled issues, which could include
the promulgation of a comprehensive statement of federal constitutional
law unifying the legal treatment in right to die cases. The issues could
not be more ripe for consideration. With the spread of the AIDS virus
and heightened public consciousness of the debilitating and wasting effect
of that disease, there is now, more than ever before, a practical necessity
for uniform guidelines from the United States Supreme Court on the
"right to die" issue. Additionally, the Cruzan case gives the United
States Supreme Court an opportunity to provide a uniform legal basis for
153. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
154. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989). Oral argument on the Cruzan case was entertained by the
United States Supreme Court on December 6, 1989. A decision in that case is pending.
155. Id. at 410-11.
156. Id. at 424.
157. Id. The court stated that "informally expressed reactions to other people's medical
condition and treatment do not constitute clear proof of a patient's intent." Id. (citation
omitted).
158. Id. at 427.
159. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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the "right to die." The Supreme Court has previously noted that the
constitutional privacy right includes the freedom to care for one's health
and person.16 Whether that freedom includes the right to terminate life-
sustaining health care is an unanswered question. Although the United
States Supreme Court has shown reluctance to sharply delineate the
outer boundaries of specific privacy rights,161 it may be more willing to
address this question with regard to the "right to die."
The Cruzan case also presents the Court with the issue of what the
proper quantum of proof should be to determine the decision an incom-
petent patient would have made, prior to becoming incompetent, in
choosing or refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.162 In addition,
the Court is faced with deciding when a "best interests" analysis is
appropriate. 1
6 3
Several other questions exist with respect to the subjective, limited
objective and pure objective tests which the Court may decide in Cruzan.
One open question is whether, if the subjective test is not satisfied, the
law should allow the exercise of substituted judgment or whether the
two-tiered approach of the limited objective test should be utilized. If no
trustworthy evidence of a patient's desire to choose or refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment under the limited objective test exists, should
the pure objective test be used to evaluate whether the provision of medi-
cal treatment would be inhumane?" 6 Further, if the limited objective or
the pure objective tests are to be used, the question arises as to what
extent the burdens of treatment must outweigh the benefits of continued
life in order to discontinue life support systems. The United States
Supreme Court may use Cruzan to clarify the usage of and interrelation-
ships among the three existing right to die tests, or it may fashion its own
standard. In any event, Cruzan presents the opportunity for a definitive
judicial statement on the "right to die."
160. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
161. This reluctance is evidenced by the Court's recent abortion decision in Webster v. Re-
productive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057-58 (1989).
162. For example, in applying the subjective test, state courts have differed on the degree of
proof required to show the patient's desires prior to becoming incompetent in order that the
substituted judgment of the guardian may be exercised. See supra notes 107-117 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of these cases.
163. For instance, under the limited objective analysis, how much evidence of the patient's
competent wishes must be shown before the court will weigh the benefits of continued life
against the burdens of treatment? Alternatively, under the pure objective analysis, in what
instances would the provision of medical treatment be inhumane?
164. An example of how the subjective, limited objective and pure objective tests could be
utilized is set forth in Figure A, infra, at 828.
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IV. WHO MAY EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL
TREATMENT?
The" essence of the concern surrounding the "right to die" is that
steps be taken to assure that patients do not fall victim to the twin evils of
neglect and abuse.165 In the words of one court, "[t]o err either way-to
keep a person alive under circumstances under which he would rather
have been allowed to die, or to allow that person to die when he would
have chosen to cling to life-would be deeply unfortunate."'166 Courts
have recognized that an approach that confronts both dangers is
necessary. 1
67
The legal trend is to allow competent patients the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment. 6 1 Since In re Quinlan,169 however, there has been
great uncertainty regarding the appropriate procedures for making deci-
sions about life-sustaining medical treatment in situations where patients
lack the capacity to make treatment decisions.' 70
For example, in 1988, Rudy Linares' infant son swallowed a balloon
and stopped breathing.171 Eight months later, the child remained in an
irreversible coma in a persistent vegetative state. 72 Mr. Linares begged
doctors to remove life-sustaining machinery from his son.
173
The child's physician stated that "the doctors agreed that the child
was in an irreversible coma and would not recover," and that "[t]here
was no medical opposition to removing the ventilator."1 74 However, the
hospital refused to act out of fear of potential legal liability. 75 While
Illinois law permitted hospitals to withdraw life-support mechanisms
from patients having no brain activity, there was no precedent in Illinois
165. A. MIESEL, supra note 67, at 6-7.
166. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 343, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985).
167. See In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 431, 529 A.2d 434, 453 (1987) (Chandler, J., concur-
ring); f Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
168. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr 297, 306 (1986);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984); In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 385,
376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978).
169. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub. nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
170. A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 6-7.
171. Johnson, Questions of Law Live On After Father Helps Son Die, N.Y. Times, May 7,
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governing patients who had only minimal brain function, as the Linares
boy had.176 The hospital's chief attorney had advised the health care
providers not to remove the life-support system because of a possibility
that criminal charges would be filed.' 77
On April 26, 1989, Mr. Linares walked into the pediatric intensive
care unit of St. Luke's Hospital and, while keeping hospital personnel
away with a .357 magnum, unplugged his son's respirator and cradled his
son in his arms until the boy died.178 Though initially charged with first-
degree murder, a grand jury refused to indict Mr. Linares. 179
In contrast, a recent line of California cases has allowed a guardian
to make a good-faith decision to discontinue life-sustaining treatment
when such a decision is in the best interests of the patient. 8 ' Today
California doctors and hospital staff confronted with a Linares-type situ-
ation are required to carry out the decision of the guardian and may do
so without fear of criminal prosecution. 18 1 Currently, under California
law, physicians or hospital staff who object for moral or ethical reasons
to discontinuation of medical treatment are obligated to transfer the pa-
tient to another facility that will carry out the guardian's decision.' 82
Overall, the decision-making procedures for incompetent patients
fall within two alternative approaches: a clinical approach and a judicial
approach.8 3 The clinical approach takes place in a clinical, rather than




179. Gasner, Terminally Ill Patients' Kin Need Less Time in Court, Newsday, June 26,
1989, Viewpoints, at 47, col. 1.
180. In In re Drabick, a California appellate court held that a conservator could authorize
the removal of life-sustaining equipment of a patient languishing in a persistently vegetative
state. 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 189, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 841, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988).
The court reasoned that each patient has the right to determine the scope of his or her medical
treatment, and noted that the right survives incompetence. Id. at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
The court also concluded that it is necessary for a conservator to exercise this right for an
incompetent in order to prevent its loss. Id. at 209, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
181. In Barber v. Superior Court, the patient was in a persistent vegetative state, though he
was not brain dead within the statutory definition. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1013, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 488 (1983). Two doctors were charged with murder, based on their accession to the
request of the patient's family to discontinue life-support equipment and intravenous tubes.
Id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The California Court of Appeal held that "a physician
has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved to be ineffective." Id. at 1017, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 491. California's Health and Safety Code now provides a definition of "brain dead":
"An individual who has sustained... irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180(a)(2) (West Supp.
1990).
182. In re Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 310, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (1988).
183. A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 148-49.
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tient's capacity to decide whether to continue life-sustaining treatment,
the designation of a surrogate to carry out the decision of the patient, and
a review of the decision by independent experts, or an ethics or prognosis
committee. 184 The judicial approach, on the other hand, requires assess-
ment of capacity, designation of a surrogate, and review of the decisions
to be made in court by a judge.'85 The clinical approach is increasingly
favored by the courts because the overall result of judicial involvement
has tended to be cumbersome and expensive. 186 Recent decisions by
courts in California, 187 Florida,'88 Georgia, 189 Minnesota 9 ° and Wash-
184. Id.
185. Id. at 149. Cf. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 759, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977). In Saikewicz, the court stated, "questions of life and
death ... require the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms
the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created. Achieving this ideal is our
responsibility and that of the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group pur-
porting to represent the 'morality and conscience of our society,' no matter how highly moti-
vated or impressively constituted." Id.
186. See N. CANTOR, supra note 30, at 114; A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 149 n.5 (citing In
re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 428, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (1987)). The New Jersey Supreme Court has
commented that
no matter how expedited, judicial intervention in this complex and sensitive area may
take too long.... The mere prospect of a cumbersome, intrusive, and expensive
court proceeding during such an emotional and upsetting period in the lives of a
patient and his or her loved ones would undoubtedly deter many persons from decid-
ing to discontinue treatment.... Too many patients have died before their right to
reject treatment was vindicated in court.
In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 357, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987). See also In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 385, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277 (Jones, J., dissenting in part) ("The lapse
of time necessarily consumed in appellate review before there can be a final judicial determina-
tion will almost always be unacceptable and makes recourse to judicial proceedings impracti-
cal."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 565-66, 747 P.2d 445,
456 (1987) (court adheres to opinion that judicial process is unresponsive and cumbersome
mechanism for decisions of this nature).
187. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 484, 493 (patient's immedi-
ate family, in consultation with doctors, can make decision that reflects known desires of pa-
tient, or, if patient's desires are unknown, decision can be made that is in patient's best
interests).
188. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984)
(vegetative, irreversibly comatose patient's right to refuse treatment could be exercised either
by close family members or by court-appointed guardian after primary treating doctor certifies
that patient is in permanent vegetative state with no reasonable prospect of regaining cognitive
function where patient had executed "mercy" will stating his desire to be allowed to die).
189. In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 446, 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (1984) ("infant's right to refuse or
terminate medical treatment may be exercised by parents or legal guardian of infant after two
physicians concur in diagnosis that infant is terminally ill with no hope of recovery and infant
exists in chronic vegetative state with no reasonable possibility of attaining cognitive
function").
190. In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 & n.4 (Minn. 1984) (judicial order was appropriate
in that particular case, but, normally, consultation between physician and family, followed by
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ingtont 9' have indicated that, under certain circumstances, termination
decisions may be made by family members and physicians without judi-
cial involvement. 192
The consequences of limiting the authority of an interested surro-
gate to carry out the desires of an incapacitated patient may be tragic.
For example, several years ago in Florida, Joy Griffith was injured in an
accident that left her in a persistent vegetative state.' 93 Eight months
after the accident, Joy's father, distraught over his daughter's condition,
shot and killed her as she lay in her hospital bed.' 94 Griffith was con-
victed of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.1 95
Although similar in nature to the Linares incident,1 96 the Griffith case
resulted in a vastly different outcome.
The tendency of the few state legislatures which have addressed the
question of surrogate decision making, is to avoid judicial involvement in
making decisions for incompetent dying patients, permitting, instead, the
decisions to be made by physicians and immediate family. 197 The courts
tend to agree that a judicial approach is required in cases where there is
disagreement among the participants to the decision-making process.' 98
approval of ethics committee, would suffice for decision making on behalf of incompetent,
dying patient).
191. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 566-67, 747 P.2d 445, 456 (1987) (decision on behalfof
incompetent patient may be made only if physicians, hospital, patient's legal guardian and
patient's immediate family agree).
192. But see Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 758-59, 370 N.E.2d at 434-35.
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibil-
ity away from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction to any committee,
panel or group, ad hoc or permanent. Thus, we reject the approach adopted by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlan case of entrusting the decision whether to
continue artificial life support to the patient's guardian, family, attending doctors,
and hospital 'ethics committee.'...
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome ques-
tion-whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from a per-
son incapable of making his own decision-as constituting a 'gratuitous
encroachment' on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life
and death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate investigation
and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was
created.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
193. Griffith v. Florida, 548 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
194. Id.
195. Id. The conviction was, however, overturned because Griffith's attorney failed to ob-
tain defendant's "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his right to a twelve-person jury. Id. at
245-46.
196. See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-68-203 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); OR.
REV. STAT. § 97.083-.084 (1987).
198. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 224, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (1987) (judicial en-
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In California, section 2355 of the California Probate Code1 99 per-
mits a conservator to authorize removal of life-sustaining medical treat-
ment if the decision is made in good faith, consistent with the patient's
best interests, and is based on medical advice.2° In California, the role
of the courts is limited to assuring compliance with the conservator's
duty under section 2355 and resolving disputes between interested parties
concerning the best interests of the incompetent patient.2 °1 California
courts do not become involved in weighing the benefits versus the bur-
dens of continued life.
202
In cases where there is no family member or close friend who can
serve as a surrogate decision maker, some states allow courts to appoint a
guardian. 20 3 Courts may look to public or private non-profit agencies to
act as guardian of the incompetent patient.2° In some cases, a court's
only option may be to act as the surrogate decision maker itself. In those
cases, the court directly approves decisions regarding the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.20 5
V. ENSURING THAT ONE'S WISHES REGARDING MEDICAL
TREATMENT ARE FOLLOWED
Due to the problems associated with decision making for incompe-
tent patients, increased attention has been given to "advance directives,"
wherein people can plan for a time when they are unable to participate in
actual decision making.206 Many legislatures have responded by enacting
croachment into substantive decisions concerning medical treatment should be limited to
resolving disputes among patient's family, attending physicians, independent physicians,
health care facility, guardian, and guardian ad litem); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 380, 529 A.2d
419, 427 (1987) (judicial review of surrogate's decision as to patient's preference is not neces-
sary unless decision of surrogate, family, physician, and Ombudsman conflict). See also Jobes,
108 N.J. at 427-28, 529 A.2d at 451; Farrell, 108 N.J. at 357, 529 A.2d at 415; Conroy, 98 N.J.
at 383, 486 A.2d at 1241; In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 937-38, 519
N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (1987).
199. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355 (West 1981).
200. Id.
201. Id. (Law Revision Commission comments).
202. Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 200, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 849 ("state's interest in preserving
life does not outweigh the patient's own rights").
203. See, e.g., Jobes, 108 N.J. at 420, 529 A.2d at 447.
204. A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 235 (citing T. APOLLONI & T. COOKE, A NEW LOOK AT
GUARDIANSHIP: PROTECTIVE SERVICES THAT SUPPORT PERSONALIZED LIVING 136 (1984)).
205. Id. at 168.
206. Id. at 313-18.
The term advance directive itself is used to denote several different things. First, it is
sometimes used to designate the concept of anticipatory health care decision making.
At other times, it is used to refer to the content of an oral or written statement made
by an individual (declarant) to become effective under stated conditions. The term is
April 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:791
natural-death 2°7 and health-care durable power-of-attorney statutes.2 8
Natural-death acts allow competent individuals to plan for decisions re-
garding the termination of life-sustaining treatment.20 9 The health-care
durable power-of-attorney statutes allow competent adults to designate
an agent to make health-care decisions, including a decision to withhold
also used to refer to a vehicle for embodying such a statement, such as a living will,
durable power of attorney, or natural death act directive.
Id. at 318.
207. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1986); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp.
1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West. Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 & Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575
(West. Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-
2421 to -2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-
1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4502 to -4509 (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 701-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 144A.1-.11 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-
2931 (Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1989); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon
Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 449.540-.690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1-16 (Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97-.050 to -
.090 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp.
1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992
(1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1
to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109
(1988).
208. N. CANTOR, supra note 30, at 123 ("The power of attorney is a writing conferring
upon a person authority to perform specified actions on behalf of the signer. Durable refers to
the continuation of the document's effect after the incapacity of the signer."). See also CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (1987); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 327D-26 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, paras. 802-1 to -11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE § 144.A.7. .a (1989); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a, § 5-501 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d)
(1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(1) (West 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.800-.860
(Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-1(9), 32A-2(9) (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 5602(a)(9), 5603(h)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1, 23-4.10-2
(1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467 (Supp. 1988).
209. N. CANTOR, supra note 30, at 106; A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 319. Meisel observes
that:
Natural death act directive is a term sometimes used to apply to an advance directive
executed pursuant to a statute enacted for the purpose of permitting, usually under
circumscribed conditions, individuals to terminate life-sustaining treatment. The
name of these directives is derived from the official name of some of the natural death
acts. The terms 'natural death act' and 'natural death act directive' have become
more generally used to refer to any directive executed pursuant to such a statute,
whether or not the statute is officially named a Natural Death Act.
A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 319 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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life-sustaining treatment.21° Some experts have indicated that the dura-
ble power of attorney may provide for better informed decision making
because the drafter of a living will cannot foresee and deal with the multi-
tude of relevant variables and the legal permutations that surround the
dying process. 21  By contrast, a durable power of attorney is retained by
a person who acts as an advocate for the patient, and as such possesses
full information about the patient's condition and is therefore better able
to make a decision consistent with the patient's previously expressed
desires.21
Most of the living-will statutes specifically preserve patients' com-
mon-law rights, thereby leaving the door open for further evolution of
right-to-die doctrines through the judiciary.21 3 Courts that have consid-
ered this issue have agreed that natural-death acts were not intended to
210. N. CANTOR, supra note 30, at 122-23. See also In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378-79, 529
A.2d 419, 426 (N.J. 1987) (citing Note, Appointing An Agent to Make Medical Treatment
Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 985, 1015-20 (1984) (recommending that durable power-of-attor-
ney statutes be construed to empower conveyance of authority to make medical decisions)); In
re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985) (patient's intent about life-sus-
taining treatment might be evidenced in durable power of attorney). The New York Court of
Appeals recently discussed New York's power-of-attorney statute in In re O'Connor:
[Miore recently the Legislature enacted a statute permitting individuals to create
"springing powers of attorney," which come into effect when another designated per-
son determines that the maker has become incompetent .... This broadens the
"durable power of attorney" which simply survives incompetency .... Although
powers of attorney have traditionally been limited to delegation of financial powers
as opposed to personal decisions .... this limitation has been eroded by court recog-
nition of the ability of third parties to express the wishes of incompetent patients
without written authority.
72 N.Y.2d 517, 528 n.2, 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 n.2, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 899 n.2 (1988).
211. N. CANTOR, supra note 30, at 122.
212. Id. at 122-23. Cantor points out that:
The assumption behind a designated proxy [durable power of attorney] is that
the designator will not only choose a particularly dependable person to act as surro-
gate decision-maker, but that extensive conversations will be held instructing the
proxy about the wishes and preferences of the designator. If this assumption is ful-
filled, the advantages of the designated proxy are patent. A specific individual then
exists at the moment of critical decision-making who is intimately familiar with the
now-incompetent patient's wishes. This eases the tasks of medical staff both by pro-
viding important information in the fact gathering process regarding the patient's
previously expressed wishes, and by avoiding confusion about legal authority such as
occurs when close family are not available or are not unanimous in their desires.
Moreover, the proxy furnishes someone to act as an advocate of the patient's position
and potential enforcer of the patient's wishes, should medical staff be reluctant to
follow the patient's previously expressed desires.
Id. at 122.
213. Id. at 106. See also Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 489 (1983) ("The lack of generalized public awareness of the statutory scheme and
the typically human characteristics of procrastination and reluctance to contemplate the need
for such arrangements however makes this [California Natural Death Act] a tool which will all
too often go unused by those who might desire it.").
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preempt common-law rights.21 Courts have also held that restrictions
imposed by natural-death acts might be avoidable if an incompetent pa-
tient had made a common-law advance directive.215 However, at least
one commentator has cautioned that some courts may find the state's
natural-death act to be the "exclusive means for issuing an advance di-
rective, [and, therefore] it might be advisable to draft two directives, one
[that complies] with the [natural-death] act and one [that does] not. 216
VI. CONCLUSION
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research has observed,
"[d]eath comes to everyone. To a few, it comes suddenly and completely
unexpectedly, but to most, it follows an opportunity for leave-taking and
for directing to some extent the mode and timing of death. ' 217 In our
country, most people eventually succumb to chronic degenerative condi-
tions.218 Irrespective of age, many people have concluded that, where
life-sustaining medical treatment is involved, death is preferable.219 In
recent years, courts have confirmed that competent patients have the
right to choose or refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.220 This right,
214. In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 214-16, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 858-60, cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1139, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 302 (1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
225 (1984); Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489; Corbett v. D'Alessandro,
487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 555-56, 747
P.2d 445, 451 (1987).
215. According to one court:
[A]s commentators have noted, the [Natural Death] Act functions as intended for
only a very limited number of patients. If the directive is executed by a person prior
to his having been diagnosed as terminally ill, it is not binding on the physician. In
addition, the procedural requirements ... are so cumbersome that it is unlikely that
any but a small number of highly educated and motivated patients will be able to
effectuate their desires.
Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (citation omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal); see also A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 325.
There is growing judicial support for advance directives without a statutory basis,
that is, for common-law advance directives. Their acceptance validates directives
that would not pass muster under a natural death act. Courts have given some ap-
proval to written common-law advance directives, which are conventionally thought
of as living wills. Somewhat ironically, there is an even greater degree of precedent
for enforcing oral advance directives [Subjective Test].
Id.; see supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
216. A. MEISEL, supra note 67, at 360.
217. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
218. Id. at 16.
219. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
223 (1984); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972).
220. See, e.g., Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
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courts have held, is based on the constitutional right to privacy or on the
common-law doctrine of informed consent.221 Some states have found a
right of privacy in their state constitutions or have enacted legislation
that specifically endorses the patient's privacy right.
Whatever the basis of the right to refuse medical treatment, the pa-
tient's right of self-determination has been the underlying driving force
behind the development of the right to die. Courts have generally found
that the right of self-determination survives even after a person becomes
incompetent and have allowed incompetent patients to exercise their
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment through third persons,
using the substituted judgment or the best interests doctrines.
In virtually all jurisdictions, the subjective substituted judgment test
is applied. Under this test, if there is sufficient evidence that the now
incompetent patient would have refused such medical treatment when
competent, then a guardian or close family member can direct future
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures. A few
jurisdictions use the limited objective and pure objective tests. These
tests are based on a best interests standard. The limited objective test is
applied when there is little evidence of what the incompetent patient
wants, but there is trustworthy information that the patient when compe-
tent would have refused treatment. The pure objective test is applied
when there is no evidence or less than trustworthy evidence of the pa-
tient's pre-incompetency wishes. For both the limited objective and the
pure objective tests, medical evidence must establish that, to some speci-
fied degree, the burdens of continued life with treatment outweigh the
benefits of that life. Under the pure objective test, a third person can
refuse or direct withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on behalf of the
incompetent patient when it is clear that the provision of such treatment
would be inhumane. Although courts have failed to provide a uniform
body of right-to-die law, the United States Supreme Court may provide
some guidance as to how the various tests could be used uniformly on a
national scale when it reviews the Cruzan case.222
In addition to the evolution of judicial common-law doctrine, vari-
ous state legislatures have enacted laws which allow competent patients
to direct the course of medical decision making in the event of incompe-
tency. State legislatures generally enact natural-death acts or a durable
power-of-attorney in health-care statutes to provide proxy decision-mak-
221. See supra notes 18-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various sources of
the "right to die."
222. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub nom Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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ers. Due to the restrictions inherent in most natural-death acts, there is a
growing recognition that the health-care durable powers-of-attorney may
be the best post-competency decision-making tool. Unfortunately, most
patients do not take the time to address these issues prior to a crisis that
may render them unable to make the decision to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. For that reason, the judicial common-law doctrine will con-
tinue to evolve and play an important role in decision making.
Under the common-law doctrine of informed consent, medical prov-
iders have an obligation to see that patients are allowed to exercise their
prerogative in choosing between the available and potentially beneficial
medical treatments and procedures.223 Recently, an article in the New
England Journal of Medicine 224 stated that:
Physicians have a responsibility to consider timely discussions
with patients about life-sustaining treatment and terminal
cases. Only a minority of physicians now do so consistently.
The best time to begin such discussions is during the course of
routine nonemergency care, remembering that not all patients
are emotionally prepared, by virtue of their stage in life, their
psychological makeup, or the stage of their illness. Neverthe-
less, as a matter of routine, physicians should become ac-
quainted with their patients' personal values and wishes and
should document them just as they document information
about medical history, family history, and sociocultural back-
ground. Such discussions and the resultant documentation
should be considered a part of the minimal standard of accepta-
ble care .... In general, health care institutions must recog-
nize their obligation to inform patients of their right to
participate in decisions about their medical care, including the
right to refuse treatment, and should formulate institutional
policies about the use of advance directives and the appoint-
ment of surrogate decision makers. Hospitals, health mainte-
nance organizations, and nursing homes should ask patients on
admission to indicate whether they have prepared a living will
or designated a surrogate. It seems especially important that
nursing homes require a regular review of patient preferences,
223. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14
(1972); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,
300-01 (1986).
224. Wanzer, Federman, Adelstein, Cassel, Cassem, Cranford, Hook, Lo, Moertel, Safar,
Stone & van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second
Look, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844, 845 (1989).
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with each patient's physician taking responsibility for ensuring
that such information is obtained and documented.
The writers in the New England Journal of Medicine article22 5 have
set forth, at long last, new standards of care that should govern the fu-
ture actions of the medical profession, and, hopefully, will lead to an
increased awareness of those seeking medical care.
Increasing the awareness of patients and their families regarding
their role in life and death decisions may increase consideration of other
highly charged issues. For example, once the medical providers have
done everything possible for a patient who is terminally ill, is it bad medi-
cal practice or immoral to assist a patient who rationally desires to com-
mit suicide? If a patient is physically unable to carry out a suicide plan,
what role, if any, can physicians and other health care providers play in
assisting the patient who wishes to effect his or her right of self-determi-
nation? As one judge has written,
[t]he right to die is an integral part of our right to control our
own destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected.
That right should, in my opinion, include the ability to enlist
assistance from others, including the medical profession, in
making death as painless and quick as possible.226
The Beverly Hills Bar Association has been considering proposed legisla-
tion which would modify California's Natural Death Act.227 The pro-
posed legislation would create a procedure whereby a competent,
terminally ill patient could receive the active assistance of a physician in
dying. It is anticipated that this proposed legislation will be presented to
the American Bar Association House of Delegates at the August 1990
Annual Meeting in Chicago.22 8 This issue will surely be raised again.
Undoubtedly, the debate will continue, and the center point of that de-
bate will focus on the patient's right of self determination.
225. Id.
226. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307 (1986)
(Compton, J., concurring).
227. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990).
228. Telephone interview with Louis B. Fox, Executive Director of the Beverly Hills Bar
Association (March 2, 1990).
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